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workbehind
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prestigious employment, such
as chief executive officers at Fortune 500
companies and presidents of colleges and
universities.' Women also suffer conscious
and subconscious negative bias from both
men and women in positions to evaluate an
applicant's capabilities and potential, making it less likely that an employer or mentor
will choose a woman instead of a man.' In
contrast to these and many other contexts,
our federal criminal justice system regularly
favors women over men. Empirical studies
show that this lenient treatment begins with
prosecutors and law enforcement officers,
who tend to forego charges against women;
continues with magistrate judges, who often
release female defendants on bail 6r on their
own recognizance pretrial; and culminates
with lesser sentences after women are found

guilty.' Post-coiviction leniency includes fewer death sentences, no incarceration when that option is available, substantially more, downward departures from the otherwise
applicable sentencing guidelines, and few upward departures.' A smaller number of studies reveal that women,
nevertheless, receive harsher sentences when they engage in
particularly "unladylike" crimes.5
The reasons for this generally favorable treatment are
open to debate. The relevant literature offers at least three
notable theories to explain such disparities: (1) the paternalism/chivalry theory; (2) a social control theory; and (3) a
multifactor explanation linked to gender." The paternalism
theory generally asserts that judges respond sympathetically
to women to protect them from harsh outcomes that they are
not designed to weather, such as extensive periods in prison.
The social control theory rests on women's strong ties to family and other social support groups, which provides structure
for behavior and, the argument goes, reduces the need to constrain women with incarceration. The multifactor theme (as
the name implies) takes a bit from the paternalism theory and
adds factors, such as child care responsibilities, that make it
more costly for the government and society to incarcerate
women for extended periods. Whatever the cause or causes of
gender inequality in our criminal justice system, the differences in
treatment deserve additional discussion and continuous and careful
monitoring by all of the system's participants. Gender-neutral criteria may legitimately justify treating men and women differently.
Or, the difference in treatment may rest on baseless stereotypes or
with prosecutors' and judges' personal bias about women.
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If there are no legitimate, nongendered reasons to treat women
more leniently, then in the aggregate, the lenient treatment harms
women because it perpetuates stereotypes about them as the "weaker
sex" and as less capable and qualified both to mastermind complex,
albeit criminal, organizations and to stand up to the rigors of life
in prison. These are the same types of explanations that decisionmakers might offer for choosing men instead of women for highpaying, leadership positions that require mental and emotional
strength. On the other hand, as I contend here, the disparities
in the way women are prosecuted and sentenced may accurately
reflect legitimate differences in women's culpability compared
to their male counterparts. These disparities may simply mirror
current societal influences, such as unequal opportunities in education, training, employment, pay, and other material resources
that impact women's roles and status when committing crimes,
just as these factors influence women and their standing in society more broadly.
In this essay, I rely on my personal experience and training,
particularly my time as a federal prosecutor, to stimulate thought
and discussion about the reasons behind the empirical data and
the corresponding gender disparities, especially in sentencing. I
offer an explanation pointing to bias and socialization outside the
criminal justice system, rather than within the system itself. In
other words, while I urge law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
probation officers, and judges to remain vigilant against treating similarly situated persons differently, whatever their unique
characteristics, I remind the same actors that justice rests on the
individual circumstances of the criminal and the crime. As long
as society continues to perpetuate gender bias, female criminals
will continue to act differently than male criminals. As a result,
those legitimate differences in culpability, criminal history, and
responsibility will persist in legitimizing federal sentences for
women involving shorter prison time, more downward departures from the sentencing guidelines, fewer upward departures
and variances, and larger sentencing breaks for acceptance of
responsibility and cooperation with authorities in the prosecution
of other crimes.7
Relying on actual cases as examples, I argue that the best
measure of sentencing injustice, as opposed to sentencing
inequity,8 between men and women requires a comparison of
the sentences assigned in multidefendant cases, rather than an
analysis of district-wide or nation-wide statistics. The difference
in the way the justice system treats men and women, I contend,
may legitimately be linked to nongendered considerations and
a proper application of the Bail Reform Act, the federal statute
governing sentencing, and the federal sentencing guidelines,
rather than invidious discrimination or irrelevant factors, such
as sympathy. For instance, the federal sentencing guidelines call
for a longer sentence for defendants who act as organizers or
leaders of criminal activity, for those who manage or supervise
other criminals, and for defendants who obstruct justice during the course of the investigation.10 In contrast, the guidelines
direct judges to shorten a defendant's sentence, if he or she
acts as a "minimal" or "minor" participant in the crime. Further,
the guidelines grant judges significant leeway to sentence even
below an otherwise statutorily mandated minimum sentence, if a
defendant has little criminal history; if a defendant did not use
violence or threats of violence or possess a dangerous weapon;
60 *THE FEDERAL LAWYER JuLy 2014

the offense did not result in serious bodily injury; a defendant is
not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of an offense;
and a defendant provides truthful information about her criminal
conduct."
Additionally, when a defendant commits a crime under duress
or coercion, not amounting to a complete defense, or to avoid a
perceived greater harm, or if the defendant's criminal conduct
constitutes aberrant behavior, the guidelines permit a judge
to decrease the otherwise applicable sentence below the usual
range. 2 Indeed, the sentencing statute on which the guidelines rest
requires judges to consider all of the circumstances of the offender
and offense in tailoring the sentence to the individual offender.'"
This opportunity for judges to exercise discretion by considering the
totality of the circumstances may lead to gender-biased decisions,
but such discretion also allows space for individual and appropriate assessments of the accused based on legitimate criteria such
as dangerousness, acceptance of responsibility, assistance to the
government, role in the crime, and susceptibility to rehabilitation
and reform.
In my experience, the criminal conduct of female defendants fits
within the mitigating sentencing categories more often than that of
male defendants. When, however, women defendants exhibit "unladylike," aggravating characteristics, such as a penchant for violence,
a record of organizing other criminals, a willingness to obstruct the
investigation, or similar traits, prosecutors and judges count those
circumstances against them, as -they do with all defendants. Those
factors properly.result in harsher charges, stricter bail decisions, and
longer sentences, including incarceration, just as they do for male
defendants.
I find it reasonable to believe that societal differences in the
treatment of women (often referred to as socialization) account for
women's (generally) lower propensity to commit crimes and that
these same differences, rather than system bias, explain why when
women break the law, they often engage in less culpable activities
with fewer aggravating circumstances than their male counterparts.
For instance, women rarely serve as organizers or supervisors of
criminal activity. They also tend to fall victim to pressure from other
criminal actors, often husbands or lovers. Because many women,
who find themselves defendants in the federal criminal justice system, exhibit these mitigating characteristics, prosecutors and judges
naturally and, in my analysis, appropriately treat these women more
favorably than they treat men who commit the same crime but
demonstrate more culpability and more dangerousness and are less
amenable to rehabilitation.
Below I use two examples from cases I helped to prosecute and
a third from the district in which I teach law to show how the disparately lenient treatment of women in the criminal justice system may
very well be the mirror image of the disparate treatment of women
in education, the workforce, the boardroom, pay, and other realms."
Case No. 1
In this example, there are two defendants-one female (W) and
one male (M). Each was a high-level employee at a historically black
college. The indictment charged the defendants jointly with unlawfully obtaining millions of dollars in federal student loans for students who did not attend the college or who attended but quit and,
therefore, did not maintain enrollment at the time the loans were
processed. The indictment similarly charged that the defendants

obtained other monies legally but kept and used them unlawfully.
At the time of indictment, W was 70 years old and the president
of the college. She had no criminal history. She was physically frail,
partially because she had suffered a series of mini strokes. The indictment alleged that W pressured the director of financial aid (M) to
obtain loan money for students who were ineligible. W agreed that
she wanted the director to be aggressive in seeking federal loans
lawfully but contended that she had no knowledge of his obtaining
loan money for which the college was ineligible. W used some of the

or managed) others. (his immediate subordinates) to obtain money
for students he knew were ineligible. And, when indicted and arrested, M did not take responsibility for his involvement in the crime but,
instead, tried to escape prosecution by fleeing the United States.
The proof against W was weaker (more circumstantial) than the
proof against M because M was directly responsible for financial aid
and personally completed at least some of the paperwork. Witnesses
could also confirm that M directed them to file paperwork seeking
loans for which the school was not eligible. W had a plausible (but

if there are no legitimate, nongendered reasons to treat women more leniently, then in the
aggregate, the lenient treatment harms women because it perpetuates stereotypes about them
as the "weaker sex" and as less capable and qualified both to mastermind complex, albeit
criminal, organizations and to stand up to the rigors of life in prison. These are the same types
of explanations that decision makers might offer for choosing men instead of women for highpaying, leadership positions that require mental and emotional strength.
money for personal and professional advancement. More specifically, some was used to benefit the college and some to benefit the
president personally. All of the loans were prohibited by the terms
of the financial aid regulations. W pled guilty to 1 of the 28 counts in
the indictment.
M was 64 years old and the director of financial aid for the college.
M reported directly to W. M had no criminal history. The indictment
alleged that Mactively and personally applied for loans for which the
college was ineligible. Some of the loans he sought were for students
who did not exist; others were for students who stopped attending
the college. M also supervised others who applied for similar loans.
M contended that any financial aid wrongfully obtained by the college was the result of poor record keeping, not knowing misconduct.
When M was first arrested on the 28-count indictment, he tried to
leave the country for India. The government contended that M was
attempting to flee adjudication of the merits of his guilt. Shortly
after that, M agreed to cooperate with the government and provide
information to help prosecute W, including testifying against her, if
necessary. Eventually, M pled guilty to one count in the indictment.

Sentences Imposed in Case No. 1
The judge sentenced W to 12 months of home confinement, 5
years probation, and to pay restitution.
The judge sentenced M to 18 months of home confinement, 5
years probation, and to pay restitution.
While the judge sentenced the defendants similarly, the female
defendant received a slightly shorter sentence, even though she held
a position within the college of more prestige and greater overall
responsibility. One could certainly argue that this case supports one
of the theories above-that judges treat women with undue sympathy. I take a different view. While both sentences were arguably overly
generous, given the extent of the fraud and the significant breach of
public trust, the disparity between defendants is rational and supported by legitimate sentencing concerns. While M's willingness to
cooperate with the government weighs in favor of a lighter sentence
for him than W, almost every other factor in the case suggests that
M was more culpable and deserved a harsher sentence. He, not W,
personally and actively filed the paperwork to obtain the fraudulent
loans. He also directed (or, in the words of the guidelines, organized

unlikely) defense that she was unaware of M's criminal behavior.
Other than M's testimony that he discussed the fraudulent loans
with W, there was no direct proof that W knew M was applying for
loans for nonstudents. W was also older than M and physically frail,
suggesting that even a short prison sentence might equate to a death
sentence. W never attempted to avoid prosecution by absconding.
She initially entered a plea of not guilty but made no other attempts
to deny responsibility. During the plea colloquy, she admitted her
involvement.

Case No. 2
In this second example, a husband and wife conspired to commit,
and actually committed, a bank robbery. The couple was strapped
for money. Husband worked as a mechanic and performed other
low-paying jobs. Wife stayed home with the couple's infant child. The
couple shared one car, which husband drove to work. Wife did not
have friends or family in the area and was completely dependent on
husband for financial support.
Husband acquired a handgun several months before the robbery
and purchased a Halloween costume a few days before. The costume
came complete with mask and cloak. Husband told his wife that he
wanted to rob a bank and that she needed to act as a lookout and
would be responsible for disposing of his costume and hiding the
money after the robbery. Wife was reluctant, but acquiesced. Wife
also knew that husband owned a gun, but she contended that he
agreed not to take the gun into the bank. Husband rented a car as a
getaway vehicle.
.
During the robbery, husband wore the Halloween costume and
brandished the pistol he owned. When husband obtained cash from a
bank teller at gunpoint, he ran from the bank, drove a couple of blocks
to a designated meeting point, and handed wife a bundle of clothes
to dispose of and the money to hide. Wife drove home and immediately began to burn the bundle of clothes in the couple's barbeque
grill. Unbeknownst to wife, husband had placed the loaded pistol in a
pocket of the costume. When the gun heated up, live rounds exploded, and the neighbors called the police. Upon initial questioning by
police, wife confessed to the crime, detailed their respective roles and
actions, and cooperated with the government against her husband.
After police found the burned evidence in the barbeque, they
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arrested husband, who denied any involvement in the crime and
refused to make a statement. Only after husband pursued motions
to suppress evidence found burned in the barbeque and completed
discovery, and after the government prepared for trial, did husband
plead guilty. Wife testified against husband at his sentencing hearing.
Husband had no criminal history. Wife had previously been convicted of a misdemeanor.

Sentences Imposed in Case No. 2
Husband was sentenced to 60 months in prison and ordered to
pay restitution.
Wife was sentenced to 18 months in prison and ordered to pay
restitution.
As with Case No. 1, I can offer a rational argument that the
sentencing judge's subconscious bias influenced the respective
sentences in ways that unfairly benefitted the female defendant
(wife) and unduly punished the male (husband). After all, wife had a
criminal history when husband had none, and both husband and wife
expressly agreed to rob a bank.
But the stronger argument, I believe, is that wife deserved a
shorter sentence. Wife denied knowing that her husband intended to
use a gun to commit the robbery, and her ignorance was buttressed
by the fact that she tried to dispose of the evidence without checking
for a gun. That mistake led to the couple's capture. When caught,
wife immediately "came clean" about her role in the crime and reluctantly agreed to implicate her husband. She later testified against
him when he would not admit his complete involvement. Likewise,
all evidence suggested that it was his idea to rob the bank and that
she was opposed to the idea but that she succumbed to his pressure
because she was completely dependent on him for resources, including resources for their child. If wife had, instead, chosen to leave her
husband, with no family or friends to rely on for help, and no car for
transportation, wife would have been relegated to leave her home on
foot, in a taxi, or on a bus, with her infant child in tow. She would also
experience significant difficulty in finding even short-term housing.

Case No. 3
In this third example, I played no personal role. Seven defendants
were involved-two female and five male. All were employees of a
Division I Athletic Department. Each played a part in skimming more
than $lmillion in basketball and football tickets to sell for personal
gain. The indictment charged conspiracy to commit wire fraud.
Defendant 1 was a 54-year-old male (Ml) associate athletic director, whom the university paid to oversee fundraising. M1 personally
profited about $300,000 from the ticket scandal. He had no prior
criminal history, paid back $64,000 before sentencing, and during the
sentencing hearing expressed remorse for his involvement.
Defendant 2 was a 44-year-old female associate athletic director (WI), who oversaw the ticket office. She resigned her position
before charges were brought. It was unclear how much she personally profited from the conspiracy because she divided her profits with
other defendants. She had no criminal history, agreed to cooperate
against other defendants, and pled guilty, yet made no statement at
her sentencing hearing.
Defendant 3 was the 46-year-old husband of W1 (M2). He consulted with the athletic department on an as-needed basis. His crime
was taking tickets funneled to him from W1, his wife, to sell for personal profit. M2 had no criminal history.
62 *THE FEDERAL LAWYER *JULY 2014

Defendant 4 was 42 years old (M3). He served as an assistalt
athietic director. He sold $975,000 worth of tickets for personal gain.
He had no criminal history and agreed to cooperate with the government in the investigation.
Defendant 5 was the most junior of the defendants (W2). She
worked as a systems analyst. She was only 28 years old with no
criminal history. She became involved in the ticket scandal when her
boss (M3) gave her cash from his own wrongful ticket sales. W2 pled
guilty early in the prosecution and expressed remorse during her
sentencing hearing.
Defendants 6 and 7 are both male (M6 and M7). They were the
least involved in the criminal conduct and pled guilty early in the
investigation to concealing the felonies of the other defendants.

Sentences Imposed in Case No. 3
Ml and W1 were each sentenced to 57 months in prison. M1 was
ordered to pay $1.19 million in restitution and $85,000 in unpaid
taxes. W1 was ordered to pay $2.56 million in restitution and unpaid
taxes.
M2 and M3 were both sentenced to 46 months in prison and a
share of restitution.
The judge sentenced W2 to 37 months incarceration, $1.3 million
in restitution, and $80,000 in unpaid taxes.
M4 and M5 received a sentence of probation only.
The district court judge sentenced M1 and W1 comparably, probably because their status in the fraud scheme was similar. Both held
positions at the university requiring trust and significant professional
responsibility. Both breached their duties to their employer and the
citizens of the state. The only notable differences between these two
defendants (other than their sex) appear to be the amount of money
they misappropriated, which could be (and was) reflected in their
restitution obligations, and the fact that WI involved her husband
(M3). M1's early repayment of part restitution might also be considered an attempt at exceptional efforts of acceptance of responsibility,
although courts do not typically count such efforts. 6
From my perspective, it seems that the sentencing judge attempted to treat similar defendants within the scheme similarly and to
carve out sentencing bands. The two defendants (one male; one
female) with the most culpability received the longest prison sentences. The two defendants with the least culpability (both male)
received no prison time. The defendants in the middle ranges (two
male and one female) received sentences between the extremes.
Only W2 was sentenced differently than any other defendant. Her
sentence was arguably appropriately lighter than Defendants 1
through 4 because although she violated the law, she had not been
hired into a position of significant public trust, like W1 and M1. Also,
her boss, the more culpable M3, lured W2 into the criminal activity.
Likewise, W2 was properly sentenced more harshly than M4 and M5,
who pled guilty to a lesser crime and who accepted responsibility for
their involvement by pleading guilty early in the investigation and by
cooperating with law enforcement in the prosecution of defendants
1 through 5.
The only difference in sentencing among the seven defendants
that might raise a valid question regarding sex bias is the lenient
treatment of M2 versus W2. Like W2, who held a low-level position
within the university and who became involved with encouragement
from her boss, M2 was a mere consultant and became involved with
the scheme only after his wife funneled tickets to him.

Inequality Versus INjustice
Women have always received more favorable treatment than men
from the American criminal justice system. The leniency women
experience may be a result of invidious discrimination and outdated
stereotypes. But my personal experience and training suggest that
the explanation is more complex and due, at least in part, to the
continuing differences in the socialization of women. As one of the
other articles in this issue shows, even at one of the finest law schools
in the country, women continue to assert themselves less than men.
They speak up less often in class and take less aggressive approaches
in seeking mentorship during law school and in pursuing top-level
employment positions after.16 Even at the Ivy League level, women
are conditioned to behave more passively than men.
When women behave in less assertive ways in criminal organizations, the justice system appropriately labels them less culpable. Of
the cases I prosecuted, not one involved a woman kingpin of the
criminal enterprise. The closest I came to a female kingpin was the
70-year-old college president referenced in Case No. 1 above. In
fact, in my own experience, I do not recall anyone else in the U.S.
Attorney's Office talking about a case they were handling in which
a woman was the key criminal. Rather, federal cases with women
defendants were (and are) relatively rare. And in those involving
female defendants, I confronted case after case in which a girlfriend,
wife, sister, or daughter supported her boyfriend, husband, brother,
or father in a criminal undertaking, playing a subordinate role. Not
uncommonly, the male mastermind exerted overt pressure on the
female to participate. Other times, the women seemed to acquiesce
more readily. In every case, an intellectually honest application of
the federal sentencing guidelines demanded that the women receive
a more lenient sentence.
I find the gender disparities in the criminal justice system
unsurprising given that few educated and accomplished women
become CEOs, CFOs, college presidents, law school deans, and other
prominent leaders. Why should we expect more success from women
criminals? G

(reporting that President Barack Obama intends to sign two executive orders addressing equal pay and noting that women continue to
earn "77 cents for every dollar men make"); Alanna Vagianos, There
Are Still Few Women at the Top of Fortune500 Companies,Says
Report, THE HUFFINGTON PosT (Dec. 11, 2013), available at www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/11/women-in-leadership-roles n 4418725.
htmli (stating there is "little to no increase of female CEOs, CFOs,
and board members over the past three years." For example, "Just
16.9 percent of corporate board seats were held by women in 2013,
the eighth consecutive year with little to no progress in narrowing
the gender gap"; in 2013, just 8.1 percent of Fortune 500's top earners were women; and "only 4.2 percent of Fortune 500 companies
employ female CEOs); Jack Stripling, Survey Finds a Drop in
Minority Presidents Leading Colleges, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION (Mar. 12, 2012), available at chronicle.com/article/WhoAre-Colleve-Presidents-/131138/ (finding that in 2011, 26.4 percent

of university presidents were women); see also Laura M. Padilla, A
Gendered Update on Women Law Deans: Who, Where, Why, and
Why Not, 15 AMi.U.J GENDER Soc. POLY' & L., 443, 461 (2007) (indicating that 18.7 percent of law school deans were women as of the
2005-2006 academic year).
2See generally Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, et. al, Science Faculty's
Subtle Gender Biases FavorMale Students, 109 PROC. OF THE NAT'L
ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. OF Ai., 16474, 16477 (2012), available at
www.pnas.org/content/109/41/16474.full.pdf+html (reporting study
in which researchers randomly assigned a male or female name to
materials of student applicants for a laboratory manager position, and
despite identical qualifications, females were less likely to be hired
but more likely to be offered a lower salary when selected).
'Stephanie Bontsager, Kelle Barrick, and Elizabeth Stupi, Gender
and Sentencing: A Meta-Analysis of ContemporaryResearch, 16
J. GENDER RACE & JUSTICE 349, 350 (2013) (noting that since 1985,
the gender gap in sentencing has been narrowing and that "women
have been entering prison at twice the rate of males"); Sonja B.
Starr, Estimating Gender Disparitiesin Federal Criminal Cases,
MICH. U. L. & EcoN. RESEARCH PAPER 4 (Aug. 2012) (noting that male
Melanie D. Wilson is a professor and the arrestees face a "modestly but significantly higher probability of
associate dean for academic affairs at a charge before a district judge" than females); David B. Mustard,
the University of Kansas School of Law. Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparitiesin Sentencing: Evidence
A! W( 9
Ms. Wilson earned a Bachelor of Arts in from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & EcoN. 285 (2001) (finding
Journalism, magna cum laude, from the significant disparities in sentencing of men and women defendants).
University of Georgia, where she was
'See id.
a scholarship athlete in golf She then
'See Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before the Law: Men, Women
attended law school at the University of and the Death Penalty, 8 AMi. U.J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & LAw 427, 459
Georgia and served on the Georgia Law (2000).
6
Review before graduatingmagna cum laude and Orderof the Cosf
See, e.g., Ann Martin Stacey and Cassia Spohn, Gender.andthe
She served as law clerk to RichardC. Freeman,US. districtcourt Social Costs of Sentencing: An Analysis of Sentences Imposed
judge, Northern District of Georgia. She also practiced law for on Male and Female Offenders in Three US. District Courts, 11
approximately 18 years, first in the litigation sections of two BERUKLEY J. CRI. L. 43, 49-51 (2006) (providing a basic overview of
national law firms, later in public service,first as an assistant these -theories).
. .
attorney generalforthe state of Georgia and subsequently as an
'In her empirical study, Sonja Starr recognizes that "unobserved
assistant US. attorney. Wilson's scholarshipcenters on criminal differences" in the crimes women commit and those men commit
procedure and prosecutorialethics.
may account for differences in treatment. Starr, supra note 3, at
12. For instance, she notes that more women receive the benefit
Endnotes
at sentencing of the "'safety valve' loophole" available to offenders
'See, e.g., Laura Bassett, Obama to Sign Executive Orders on who face mandatory minimums for drug crimes. Id. at 13. She also
Equal Pay, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 6, 2014), available at www. acknowledges that women "might [rightly) be viewed as minor
huffinetonpost.com20l4/04/06/obama-equal-iav n 5100361.html players." Id.
i
.
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81 view sentencing injustice as disparate treatment based on
illegitimate grounds, while sentencing inequality may be legitimate
and reasonable discrimination between two people because of their
materially different and relevant circumstances.
9
The Bail Reform Act of 1984, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142, et seq., provides
statutory guidance to magistrate judges who must decide whether to
detain or release the accused pending trial. The sentencing statute
provides similar guidance for federal judges who must sentence
convicted defendants. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553, et seq. Finally, federal
sentencing guidelines, see infra notes 10-12, are advisory guidelines
designed to assist federal judges in meting out similar punishments
for similarly situated defendants based on their like criminal histories,
and the similarities of their criminal conduct.
10U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 311.1, §3C1.1 (2013).
"U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 311.2, § 5C1.2 (2013). In
her study of gender disparities in federal criminal cases, Sonja Starr
notes that fact-finding for sentencing and guidelines departures "are
both stages in which men's and women's outcomes appear to diverge
substantially." Starr, supra note 3, at 11. In my view, Starr's findings
are consistent with my contention that such significant disparities can

be explained by meaningful differences in women and men's criminal
conduct (in most cases) that warrants disparate sentencing. Starr
seems to disagree. See id. at 12 ("there are good reasons to doubt
that [nuance differences in underlying criminal conduct] explain
much of the observed disparity.").
"U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.12, § 5K2.11, § 5K2.20
(2013).
"See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (directing that the court "shall impose
a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to "reflect
the seriousness of the offense ... afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct ... to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant," and to effectuate rehabilitation).
"I have avoided using the names of the defendants to allow
readers to focus on the gender disparity issues.
"See United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2013)
(reversing the district court's decision to take into account the
defendant's "full restitution payment" in deciding what sentence to
impose).
'6See Ruth Anne French-Hodson, The Continuing Gender Gap
in Legal Education,THE FEDERAL LAWYER, July 2014, at 80.

PRESUMED INCOMPETENT continued from page 57
not just academia. For a comprehensive review of the social science
literature on implicit racial bias, see Cheryl Staats, State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2013, available at www.kirwaninstitute.
osu.edu/reports/2013/03 2013 SOTS-Implicit Bias.Ddf (last accessed
April 18, 2014).
'"Serena Easton, On Being Special, in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT,
supra note 2, at 153.
"Linda Trinh V6, Navigating the Academic Terrain: The
Racial and Gender Politics of Elusive Belonging, in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT, supra note 2, at 107-108.
'5See Francisca de la Riva-Holly, Igualadas,in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT, supra note 2, at 292-294 (discussing tenure denial and
negative performance reviews based on lack of "collegiality").
'6Yolanda Flores Niemann, The Making of a Token: A Case
Study of Stereotype Threat, Stigma, Racism and Tokenism in
Academe, in PRESUMED INCOMPETENT, supra note 2, at 344.
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